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Denial of Social Host Liability for Furnishing Alcohol
to a Visibly Intoxicated Guest in Klein v. Raysinger: A
Failure in Judicial Reasoning*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Klein v. Raysinger, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that a social host who serves alcoholic beverages to his or her
adult 2 guests is not subject to liability under common law princi-
ples of negligence for injuries and damages sustained as the result
of a subsequent motor vehicle accident involving the intoxicated
adult guest.3 Klein involved a factual situation wherein the plain-
tiffs were the occupants4 of an automobile which was being law-
fully driven on the Pennsylvania Turnpike when it was struck
from behind by a vehicle driven by an intoxicated Mark Raysinger.
Prior to the accident, Raysinger had been served alcoholic bever-
ages at the home of Mr. and Mrs. William Gilligan and subsequent
thereto had also been served at a bar.5 It was alleged by the plain-
tiffs that Raysinger was visibly intoxicated at the time he was
served by the Gilligans, that they knew, or should have known,
that he would be driving and that the Gilligans were, therefore,
* The author would like to thank Mrs. Alberta E. Broman for all of the typing she has
done for him throughout his college and law school years.
1. - Pa. -, 470 A.2d 507 (1983).
2. In a case decided on the same day as Klein, Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., -
Pa. -, 470 A.2d 515 (1983), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a social host who
served intoxicating beverages to a minor can be subject to civil liability for injuries sus-
tained by the minor or third parties as a result of a subsequent motor vehicle accident
involving the minor. Liability was predicated on negligence per se because the furnishing of
alcoholic beverages to a minor is a violation of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 306, 6308 (Purdon 1983). 470 A.2d at 517-18. For a more complete discussion
of Congini, see Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, 1983, 57 TEMp. L.Q. 453 (1984).
3. Klein, 470 A.2d at 510-11.
4. The automobile was driven by Michael Klein with his family, Shirley, Myron and
Phillip Klein, as passengers. Michael, Myron and Phillip sustained personal injuries as a
result of the collision which caused the death of Shirley Klein. 470 A.2d at 508.
5. Id. There were two separate actions. One was brought by Michael Klein for per-
sonal injuries against Mark Raysinger, The Neptune Inn, Mr. and Mrs. William T. Gilligan
and Michael Gilligan. A second action was brought by Myron Klein and Phillip Klein for
personal injuries, and by Myron Klein as Administrator of the Estate of Shirley Klein, for
personal injuries, survivorship and wrongful death. Id.
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liable for the resultant injuries. The trial court sustained the de-
murrers of the social host defendants, after which the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania upheld the lower court's rulings.7 The cases
were then consolidated for appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court."
The supreme court relied upon three grounds to deny the exis-
tence of a cause of action in negligence. The court stated that such
an action would be new; it did not exist at common law.9 Secondly,
while not deferring the decision to the state legislature, the court
nonetheless placed a great deal of emphasis on the role of legisla-
tures in the extension of liability to social hosts. 10 The final, and
most important, basis for denial was, in accordance with the rule of
common law, "that in the case of an ordinary able bodied man, it
is the consumption of the alcohol, rather than the furnishing of the
alcohol, which is the proximate cause of any subsequent
occurrence."
11
On June 27, 1984, six months after Klein was decided, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Gwinnell,2 held that a social
host who served intoxicating beverages to a visibly intoxicated
adult guest, whom he or she knew would thereafter be driving, was
liable for injuries and damages suffered by an innocent third party
which Were due to the intoxication-related negligent driving of the
adult guest.13 The legal reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme
6. Id.
7. Klein v. Raysinger, 298 Pa. Super. 246, 444 A.2d 753 (1982). In .the action brought
by the driver, Michael Klein, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, relying on Manning v. Andy,
454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973) (see infra notes 10, 49-51 and accompanying text), held that
there was no cognizable cause of action at law. 298 Pa. Super. at 247-49, 444 A.2d at 753-54.
In the action brought by the passengers, the superior court, in sustaining the demurrer,
stated that any recognition of a new cause of action against social hosts would have to come
from the legislature or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Klein v. Raysinger, 302 Pa.
Super. 248, 252, 448 A.2d 620, 623 (1982).
8. 470 A.2d at 508. See supra note 5.
9. Id. The court stated that a recognition of liability would constitute a "new cause of
action." Id. Such ground is closely related to the theory that consumption is the proximate
cause, and it implies a static view of the common law. See infra note 12 and accompanying
text.
10. 470 A.2d at 509-510. The court in Klein never explicitly expressed deference to the
legislature. In Manning v. Andy, however, the court did explicitly defer to the legislature in
this area of law, declining to extend liability to non-licensed furnishers of alcohol. The court
stated that "[w]hile appellant's proposal [to extend liability] may have merit, we feel that a
decision of this monumental nature is best left to the legislature." 454 Pa. at 241, 310 A.2d
at 76.
11. 470 A.2d at 510.
12. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
13. Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224. The plaintiff, Marie Kelly, was seriously injured when
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Court is in complete contrast to that employed by the Pennsylva-
nia court. The liability found to exist in Kelly was based on com-
mon law principles of negligence and emanated from a duty owed
to the public to refrain from the creation of foreseeable, unreason-
able risks. 4 The host who furnished the alcohol and the guest who
consumed the alcohol were held liable as joint tortfeasors, thereby
resolving any possible issue of proximate causation.'5 Finally, the
New Jersey Supreme Court dealt with the issue of legislative defer-
ence by asserting that New Jersey courts have traditionally de-
cided the scope of duty in negligence causes of action."
This comment will examine the legal reasoning of the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court in each of the three issues before it in Klein.
Attention will be focused upon comparisons of the Pennsylvania
decision with the legal reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Kelly v. Gwinnell, as well as that employed in other jurisdic-
tions. Finally, the Klein decision will be closely examined in light
of established Pennsylvania negligence principles in order to deter-
mine the soundness of the decision.
II. COMMON LAW-IMMUTABLE OR ADAPTABLE?
A. The Restrictive Approach of Klein
In the absence of a statutory provision for a cause of action in
tort, the principles of the common law became essential to the cre-
ation or recognition of a cause of action in negligence.' 7 The com-
mon law can be viewed either as a fixed, immutable set of princi-
ples, usages and rules which can be applied to meet any situation
arising now, or in the future, or, instead, as flexible principles and
rules which are adaptable to changing times.'8
her automobile was involved in a collision with a car operated by an intoxicated Donald
Gwinnell, who testified that he had two or three scotch drinks while at the home of Joseph
and Catherine Zak. A blood test taken of Gwinnell showed a blood alcohol reading of 0.286
percent; a reading of 0.10 percent or more violated New Jersey law for driving while intoxi-
cated. The expert retained by Kelly testified that Gwinnell had in fact consumed thirteen
drinks and must have been visibly intoxicated while at the Zak's residence. Id.
14. Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
15. Id. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
16. Id. at 552-59, 476 A.2d at 1226-29.
17. Although "common law" may be defined in a variety of ways, it is generally re-
ferred to as "those principles, usages and rules of action applicable to the government and
security of persons and property which do not rest for their authority upon any express or
positive declaration of the will of the legislature." Bishop v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 415
(S.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd on other ground, 476 F.2d 977 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 911
(1973).
18. See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Klein, treated the common
law as if its rules were fixed and immutable. Justice McDermott,
writing for the majority,19 stated that in accordance with, and as a
consequence of, the recognized common law rule-that it is the
consumption, not the furnishing, of alcohol which is the proximate
cause of any intoxification-related occurrence-liability on the part
of social host would be denied. 20 This rather mechanical adherence
to a common law rule developed in the eighteenth century, coupled
with the lack of any substantive discussion of the specifics of negli-
gence principles seems to reflect a view of the common law as im-
mutable. This restrictive, unchanging view of the common law
rule-of consumption liability alone-is by no means a novel ap-
proach, but is in fact quite a common basis for denial of social host
liability.2
B. Critique of the Klein Approach
This rigid adherence to ancient common law rules and principles
is not in line with the general consensus which holds that the com-
mon law should not be static but instead has the vitality and ca-
pacity to grow with, and adapt to, a changing world.22 This view of
the common law as something flexible and expansive has been fol-
lowed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court over the last niniety
years and continues today.23 In 1960, the supreme court used just
19. 470 A.2d at 507. Justices Nix, Flaherty, Hutchinson, and Zappala joined Justice
McDermott's opinion. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, as did Justice Lar-
sen. Id. at 511.
20. Id. at 510. In Congini the court reiterated its reliance on the common law rule in
arriving at a decision in Klein. 470 A.2d at 517. See supra note 2.
21. See Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981); Kowal v.Hofher,
181 Conn. 355, 436 A.2d 1 (1980); Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145 (1979); Garcia
v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970); Halverson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76
Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969); Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945).
22. Maricopa County Mun. Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Southwest Cotton Co.,
39 Ariz. 65, 81-82, 4 P.2d 369, 375 (1931) (the common law must be allowed to change or it
will cease to be the common law and become a rigid code); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S.
371, 382-83 (1933). See also Lembke v. Unke, 171 N.W. 2d 837 (N.D. 1969) (court quoting
leading justices and judicial thinkers on the flexibility of the common law).
23. For the historical development of, and adherence to, this view by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, beginning with its first application and continuing to the present, see Com-
monwealth v. Hess, 148 Pa. 98, 23 A. 977 (1892) (common law must adapt to new phases
and modes of doing business); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158, 175, 106 A. 238, 244
(1919) (common law which once held that any part of a party wall built on the land of
another would constitute a trespass had to-adapt to more densely populated areas to allow
slight encroachment); Nesbit v. Riesenman, 298 Pa. 475, 148 A. 695 (1930); Commonwealth
v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 166 A.2d 501 (1960).
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such an approach not only to change, but to abolish the common
law evidentiary rule that no one may be responsible for a murder
in which death occurs one year and a day after the fatal assault is
committed.24 The court noted improvements in forensic medicine,
and then stated that "[a] rule becomes dry when its supporting
reason evaporates: cessante ratione legis cessat lex.
' '25
It is clear that the changing conditions to which the common law
is to adapt would include technological advances in general2" and
more specifically the technological development of the automo-
bile.27 In Nesbit v. Riesenman,5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that a public garage located in a residential area could be con-
sidered a nuisance.2 9 The court specifically stated that when apply-
ing the principle that the common law is to adapt itself to modern
conditions the automobile is to be considered one such develop-
ment.30 The court noted that the automobile can be injurious to
health and safety and so should be considered a nuisance when
applying common law principles. 3'
Generally, when courts have taken into consideration the devel-
opment of the automobile and its effect on the common law, it has
been done in the context of whether or not the particular occur-
rence was reasonably foreseeable in line with common law princi-
ples of negligence. 2 This is precisely how the New Jersey Supreme
24. Id. (victim was struck by the defendant on September 21, 1958 and died on No-
vember 1, 1959).
25. Id. at 173, 166 A.2d at 506.
26. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. See also Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J.
353, 362, 157 A.2d 497, 501 (1960) (due to advances in medical technology an infant plaintiff
could now recover for the negligent infliction of prenatal injuries); New Orleans & N.E.R.
Co. v. Watson, 157 Miss. 243, 244, 128 So. 105, 106 (1930) (development of highly explosive
and inflammable materials such as gasoline would allow for the expansion of liability for
destruction of nearby property resulting from the negligent wreck of a train).
27. See Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 279 INI. 2d 550, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954) (involving the
liability of a taxicab owner for damages resulting from the wreck of the taxicab which had
been left negligently unlocked with the motor running, was stolen by a thief and then
wrecked); McIntosh v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 111 Ind. App. 550, 38 N.E.2d 263 (1941)
(plaintiff was injured when struck by parts of an automobile which had collided with defen-
dant's train).
28. 298 Pa. 475, 148 A. 695, cert. denied, 281 U.S. 754 (1930).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 483-84, 148 A. at 697.
31. Id.
32. See supra note 27. See also Halverson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759,
458 P.2d 897 (1969), where Judge Finley, dissenting to the denial of social host liability
under common law negligence principles stated:
[T]he freeway, the high-compression gasoline engine, and the high-speed automobile
were also unknown to the common law. So were-the social dangers resulting from the
1985 1125
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Court handled the issue of social host liability in holding that the
social host would be liable for serving a visibly intoxicated guest
later involved in an automobile accident.3 The court also stated
that under common law principles there was a duty owed by the
host to the public not to create foreseeable, unreasonable risks,
34
and that the possibility of the intoxicated guest being involved in
an accident was clearly foreseeable.3 5 In determining the fairness of
imposing the duty and the reasonable foreseeability of the conse-
quences, the court placed heavy emphasis on the widespread
knowledge among the public regarding the high number of traffic
fatalities and damages caused by the intoxicated driver of an
automobile.3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's failure to even discuss the
possible existence of a recognition of social host liability under
common law negligence principles is difficult to reconcile with its
view of the common law as flexible, and its recognition of the effect
on the common law of the development of the automobile.37 The
rigidity of its adherence to the pre-automobile common law princi-
ple that it is the consumption, rather than the furnishing, of alco-
hol that is the sole basis of liability seems directly at odds with its
approaches elsewhere.38 In light of this, one would have expected,
at the very least, a discussion or recognition of the issue. One pos-
sible explanation for this lapse is that the court may have desired
to defer such a decision to the legislature.
III. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE FLEXIBLE COMMON LAW
A. Deference to the Legislature
It is a widely recognized and accepted legal philosophy that the
judiciary is to defer to the legislature in areas which are deemed to
lackadaisical mixture of alcohol and gasoline. Times change, and the common law
changes with the times-slowly, perhaps, but quite surely-as historical perspective
clearly demonstrates .... [Tihere were no automobiles "at common law" capable of
transformation by an inebriate from a useful mechanism into an engine of violence
and destruction.
Id. at 765-67, 458 P.2d at 901 (Finley, J., dissenting). Similar thoughts are echoed in Slicer
v. Quigley, 180 Conn. 252, 262, 429 A.2d 855, 860 (Bogdanski, J., dissenting).
33. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228.
34. Id. at 547-48, 476 A.2d at 1224.
35. Id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
36. Id. at 544-45, 548-52, 476 A.2d at 1222, 1224-26, 1229.
37. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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involve the lawmaking function of the legislature.39 When consider-
ing Pennsylvania's rather strict adherence to this philosophy, ° it is
surprising that the decision reached by Justice McDermott in
Klein was not firmly grounded upon deference to the legislature.
There is support in the laws of other states for the proposition
that, in the absence of an action at common law, any recovery
must be provided for by the legislature. "1
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Klein never stated explic-
itly that its decision was based upon deference to the legislature
regarding this particular issue. Quite to the contrary, the majority
was most explicit in basing its decision on the common law rule
that the consumption, rather than the furnishing of alcohol, was
the proximate cause of any subsequent occurrence. 2
The court in Klein, however, did indirectly imply that a decision
on social host liability is more appropriately within the sphere of
the legislature. This may be discerned in the Klein court's refer-
ence to the California Supreme Court's finding of social host liabil-
ity under negligence principles in Coulter v. Superior Court of San
Mateo,43 and to the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Weiner v.
Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity,"' which in-
dicated a willingness to consider such liability. 45 Justice McDer-
mott noted that the California legislature expressly abrogated the
decision through a statutory enactment which also barred any fu-
ture finding of social host liability."6 It was further noted by the
Klein court that the Oregon legislature also took the issue out of
39. Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. 513, 523, 412 A.2d 1094, 1099
(1980) (social policies are to be addressed by the legislature, not by the courts); Mt. Leba-
non v. County Board of Elections, 470 Pa. 317, 320, 368 A.2d 648, 649 (1977) (legislative
power consists of the power to make, alter or repeal laws and the courts are not to encroach
on this power). See generally Hatcher v. Hatcher, 265 Ark. 681, 580 S.W.2d 475 (1979);
Henderson v. Evans, 268 S.C. 127, 232 S.E.2d 331 (1977).
40. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis, 70 Ga. App. 379, 28 S.E.2d 329 (1943)
(the court held there was no liability at common law for furnishing liquor to an intoxicated
person and only the legislature could authorize such recovery). See also American Auto Ins.
Co. v. Molling, 239 Minn. 74, 86, 57 N.W.2d 847, 855 (1953) (where the court stated that the
common law doctrine of marital immunity was so well established that it had become, in
essence, statutory and could thus only be changed by the state legislature).
42. 470 A.2d at 510-11. The majority stated, "We agree with this common law view,
and consequently hold that there can be no liability on the part of a social host who served
alcoholic beverages to his or her adult guests." Id.
43. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669 (1979).
44. 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1981).
45. 470 A.2d at 509-10.
46. Id. at 509.
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the hands of its courts by statutory enactment.4 7 The examples re-
ferred to by the majority are, however, the closest the court ever
approaches to a concrete deference to the legislature.4 8
In Manning v. Andy, 49 decided over ten years prior to Klein, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did expressly state that the recogni-
tion of social host liability was of such monumental proportions
that it was more appropriate for legislative determination. ° On the
surface this would seem to be a sufficient source upon which to rely
in ascertaining the majority's philosophy in Klein, were it not for
the Klein majority's distinction of Manning. The majority stated
that the liability of a social host under common law negligence
principles was one of first impression in Pennsylvania, and that
Manning was to be viewed in the context of social host liability
under Pennsylvania's statutory law.51 This returns any analysis to
the four corners of the Klein decision and the court's failure to
expressly defer to the legislature.2
B. Judicial Activist Approach
The philosophy of judicial activism may be distinguished from
the legislative deference approach discussed above. Judicial activ-
ism can be defined as a philosophy which allows appellate judges
to depart from strict adherence to judicial precedent in order to
shape new or progressive rules of law, an approach which may in-
trude on the functions of the legislature.5 This approach can be,
and has been, applied to the change of common law rules and prin-
47. Id. at 510. The Oregon statute, unlike that of California, does allow a finding of
social host liability for damages incurred or caused by the furnishing of alcoholic beverages
to a "visibly intoxicated" guest. Id. at 510 n.11.
The court also referred to action taken by the Minnesota legislature which amended its
dram shop act to bar any action for social host liability. The majority further noted action
taken by the Iowa legislature to preclude action against a social host under Iowa's dram
shop statute. Id. at 509 n.8.
48. In the companion case to Klein, where the court found social host liability for
damages resulting from the serving of minors, the decision was based on the Pennsylvania
legislature's establishment of criminal liability for the serving of minors. The court per-
ceived this as a "legislative decision to protect both minors and the public at large from the
perceived deleterious effects of serving alcohol to persons under twenty-one years of age."
Congini, 470 A.2d at 518. The social host liability found in Congini is therefore not based
upon common law principles of negligence.
49. 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973). See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
50. Id. at 239, 310 A.2d at 76.
51. 470 A.2d at 508. See infra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text; infra notes 108-11 and accompany-
ing text.
53. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 760 (5th ed. 1979).
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ciples and is consistent with the belief that the common law should
adapt to a changing society. 4 One of the basic justifications and
pre-conditions for the assumption of such an active role by the ju-
diciary-ignoring any sociological, public policy, or other theoreti-
cal justification given by the court-is that the common law rule or
principle being modified or abolished was originally created by a
judicial decision and being of such origin it is within the power of
the court to rightfully change or modify the rule. 5 This power or
ability of a court to change the common law is seen by some courts




For a court to engage in judicial activism does not mean that the
legislature is ignored by the court. Quite to the contrary, a court
can act within a framework in which it recognizes that the ultimate
power to decide the subject matter at issue will rest with the
legislature.57
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Gwinnell adopted
precisely such an approach when it affirmatively claimed a proper
role in the decision to create liability while, at the same time, ac-
knowledging that the ultimate power to make such a decision rests
with the legislature.58 The majority opinion in Kelly is premised
upon the finding of common law negligence on the part of the so-
54. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text for examples of this concept.
55. See generally Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968) (in
modifying absolute governmental immunity by allowing tortious liability involving use and
operation of motor vehicles, court postulated that once the reason for a rule ceases, the rule
itself ceases and in effect dissolves itself); Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Scott, 108 Miss. 871, 67 So.
491 (1915) (establishing power of an appellate court to limit issues when awarding a new
trial).
For a more complete discussion of judicial activism, see Peck, The Role of the Courts and
Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1963).
56. See Brown, 183 Neb. at 434, 160 N.W.2d at 808. See also Layne v. Tribune Co.,
108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933) (change in common law libel regarding a defendant
newspaper).
This perceived duty to adapt the common law when impelled by feelings of justice and
concern for the public welfare was adopted earlier by the New Jersey courts in Koplik v. C.
P. Trucking Corp., 47 N.J. Super. 196, 135 A.2d 555 (1957). The superior court held that the
doctrine of interspousal immunity would not cause the action to abate when the female
plaintiff passenger married the defendant male operator pendente lite. Id. The supreme
court reversed and held that common law immunity would persist except for the state
stautory exception under which the parties in the involved case did not fall. See Koplik v.
C.P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958).
57. See Peck, supra note 55, at 290.
58. 96 N.J. at 552-55, 476 A.2d at 1226-27. See Peck, supra note 55, at 286. Even those
such as Peck who favor an active role for the judiciary concede that the ultimate power lies
with the legislature, which can revise or repudiate the attempted reform. Id.
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cial host." The court had no difficulty in finding that a social host
by his action of serving a visibly intoxicated person, whom the host
knows will soon be driving, has created the risk of a reasonably
foreseeable injury. 0 The fundamental question thus became
whether there existed a duty on the part of the social host to pre-
vent this risk.6 1 The majority at this point affirmatively stated that
it had been an historical function of the judiciary to determine the
scope of duty in negligence cases and that its decision was there-
fore well within that permissible scope. 2
After proclaiming its proper role in establishing liability of the
social host, the Kelly court replied to criticism that the decision
was one for the legislature to make. The majority first responded
to the argument that the legislature was in a position to obtain the
superior information necessary to make such an important deci-
sion. The court asserted that if the legislature disagreed with the
court's establishment of social host liability the ultimate remedy
was legislative modification. The majority contended that while it
may be true that more information could be gained through legis-
lative study, the personal and financial destruction caused by in-
toxicated drivers was so obvious as to render insignificant the value
59. 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
60. Id. In the instant case Zak had been served approximately thirteen drinks in the
one or two hours he was at the Gwinnell house. Id. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220. This led the
court to conclude:
Under the facts here defendant provided his guest with liquor, knowing that there-
after the guest would have to drive in order to get home. Viewing the facts most
favorably to plaintiff (as we must, since the complaint was dismissed on a motion for
summary judgment), one could reasonably conclude that the Zaks must have known
that their provision of liquor was causing Gwinnell to become drunk, yet they contin-
ued to serve him even after he was visibly intoxicated. By the time he left, Gwinnell
was in fact severely intoxicated. A reasonable person in Zak's position could foresee
quite clearly that this continued provision of alcohol to Gwinnell was making it more
and more likely that Gwinnell would not be able to operate his car carefully. Zak
could foresee that unless he stopped providing drinks to Gwinnell, Gwinnell was
likely to injure someone as a result of the negligent operation of his car.
Id. at 543-44, 476 A.2d at 1221-22.
61. Id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222. Whether or not such a duty should be imposed upon a
social host was viewed by the court as essentially a question of fairness. Id.
62. Id. at 552, 555, 476 A.2d at 1226, 1228. The majority conceded that if the New
Jersey Legislature had enacted a Dram Shop Act prior to their decision, such an enactment
would'present the basis for a significant, though not absolute, argument against finding so-
cial host liability. The theory being that the legislature considered the liability of all possi-
ble parties, including social hosts, and chose licensees as the only liable parties. Id. at 554,
476 A.2d 1227.
63. Id. at 560-70, 476 A.2d at 1230-36 (Garibaldi, J.,' dissenting).
64. Id. at 554-55, 476 A.2d at 1227-28.
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of legislative study.6 ' Finally, the majority did not believe the deci-
sion ran contrary to the will of the public but rather was in step
with what the court perceived to be a significant adverse public
reaction against drunken driving."6
C. Critique of the Pennsylvania Approach
As stated earlier in this comment, the approach which involves
deference to the legislature in matters such as the change or modi-
fication of a common law rule or principle is widely recognized and
accepted." While not immune from attack by those favoring a
more active role by the judiciary, the legislative deference ap-
proach is on solid historical ground.
On the issue of social host liability, the legislative deference ap-
proach is best exemplified by the dissent of Justice Garibaldi in
Kelly v. Gwinnell.' Justice Garibaldi began by setting forth what
she perceived to be the ultimate goal of imposing social host liabil-
65. Id. at 558, 476 A.2d at 1229. Justice Garibaldi, in her dissent, argued that the
majority opinion failed to deal with the tremendous economic costs which may have to be
borne by the social host. Id. at 568-69, 476 A.2d at 1234-35 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The
majority responded by stating that the loss should not be borne solely by the innocent vic-
tims and that by imposing liability on the social host the loss is actually being spread out
further than before. The court then maintained, without support, that social hosts will be
covered by their homeowners insurance. Ultimately, however, the majority was simply more
concerned with the destructive effects of drunk driving than with the economic fate of those
furnishing alcohol to visibly intoxicated guests. Id. at 557-58, 476 A.2d at 1229.
66. Id. at 558-59, 476 A.2d at 1229. Peck raises the following argument on judicial
activism:
One of the arguments that might be made against this realistic approach to
problems of government is that it conflicts with our democratic faith. In a society
dedicated to representative government there is legitimate concern about judicial
methods of policymaking. After all, even if elected, judges are not chosen for their
abilities to represent or respond to public pressures.
However, Peck recognizes the counterargument:
They are, however, men trained by their profession to exercise self-restraint. They
are certainly capable of distinguishing between the problems that would arise if they
acted in conflict with legislative pronouncements and the problems of action in an
area in which no such conflict exists. The judge who makes that distinction is as
responsive to the electorate as the legislature which enacted the statute. Indeed, to
argue that judicial creativity properly confined to areas where no conflict with repre-
sentational determinations exists is contrary to our democratic traditions is to argue
that one of those traditions is itself in conflict with the others. Quite clearly, the
common law today is not what it was at the founding of this nation, and the ability of
judges to change and adapt it to different circumstances has been one of the greatest
achievements of our judicial system.
Peck, supra note 55, at 285-86. What prevents this from becoming a tyranny of the judiciary
is, according to Peck, that the ultimate power lies with the legislature. Id. at 286.
67. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
68. 96 N.J. at 560-70, 476 A.2d at 1230-36 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
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ity-to reduce the personal and property damage suffered as the
result of drunken driving and protecting the innocent injured
party, while at the same time avoiding the placement of a heavy
personal and financial burden on the average citizen. 9 Justice Gar-
ibaldi contended that the 'legislature was better equipped to effec-
tuate this goal.70
One reason advanced for deference to the legislature was that
the majority had made its decision with insufficient information.
The legislature, according to Justice Garibaldi, would have been
better able to compile the information necessary to make a fully
informed decision.7 1 The majority contended that one justification
for the establishment of social host liability was the problem of the
innocent victim. 72 Justice Garibaldi responded by examining the
legislatively enacted automobile insurance program of New Jersey,
finding what she believed to be adequate protection for the party
injured by the drunken driver.73 She then stated that the legisla-
ture could further investigate the adequacy of the remedies availa-
ble to the victims of drunken drivers.
7 4
While Justice Garibaldi did concede the possibility that a court
69. Id. at 560, 476 A.2d at 1230 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
70. Id. The dissent drew support from decisions of other states which Justice Gari-
baldi claimed stood for the proposition that the creation of social host liability is such a
radical change from common law that such a decision is best made by the legislature. Id. at
561-62, 476 A.2d at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
For the cases cited by Justice Garibaldi, see Kowal v. Hofher, 181 Conn. 355, 436 A.2d 1
(1980); Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill.App.3d 596, 52 Ill. Dec. 183, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981); Behnke
v. Pierson, 21 Mich. App. 219, 175 N.W.2d 303 (1970); Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314
N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982); Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145 (1979); Hamm v.
Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969); Schirmer v. Yost, 60 A.D.2d 789,
400 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1977); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct.1975),
aff'd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976); Klein v. Raysinger, - Pa. -, 470 A.2d 507
(1983); Halverson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash.2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969).
71. 96 N.J. at 563-64, 476 A.2d at 1232-33 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 557-58, 476 A.2d at 1229.
73. Id. at 564, 476 A.2d at 1232-33 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi
pointed out that all motorists are required to carry uninsured motorist coverage; in the
event the drunk driver is uninsured and insolvent, the victim's insurance should cover at
least part of the damages. Were the victim an uninsured pedestrian, Justice Garbaldi as-
serted that an unsatisfied judgement could be satisfied from New Jersey's Unsatisfied Claim
and Judgment Fund. The only victim which Justice Garibaldi claimed was not protected
was the uninsured drunk driver himself. Id.
74. Id. at 564, 476 A.2d at 1233. The dissent also mentioned possible problems with
insurance coverage for the social hosts and the resultant economic problems and conse-
quences which emanate from the necessity of procuring sufficient coverage. The dissent did
not specifically mention that the legislature was the proper party to consider this problem,
although one may reasonably infer that such would be endorsed by the dissent. See id. at
568, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
1132
Social Host Liability
may be forced to act in certain situations without any legislative
guidance, she did not believe that such guidance was lacking in the
instant case. A recent legislative enactment in New Jersey created
a criminal penalty for serving alcohol to a minor. The absence in
the bill of the imposition of a criminal penalty on social hosts for
serving adults was seen by Justice Garibaldi as reflecting a clear
legislative intent that no such penalty should exist in tort law.75
The dissenting opinion concluded with a mention of the wide vari-
ety of possible remedies available to the injured parties which fall
short of what Justice Garibaldi perceived as the unlimited liability
imposed on the public by the majority.76
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Klein, however, chose not
to directly discuss deference to the legislature.77 Furthermore,
there exists the discrepancy between the approach of the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in Manning, where it was held that the deci-
sion on social host liability was a matter reserved to legislative res-
olution, and the approach of the Klein court which followed the
common law.78 If the Klein court had taken the widely accepted
Manning approach of deference to the legislature, the decision
would have been unsusceptible to any substantive attack on the
grounds of defective legal reasoning.
79
The Klein court decided that the proximate cause could not be
the serving of intoxicating beverages to the intoxicated guests.8 0 As
stated earlier, the Kelly court approached the issue as one of de-
ciding the scope of duty in tort law, a function which it believed to
be within the sphere of the judiciary." The Pennsylvania Superior
Court has also recognized that it is the role of the court to define
the limitations on liability.2 This being the case, the discussion
must now turn to the quality and consistency of the legal reasoning
of the Klein court in light of relevant Pennsylvania case law re-
75. Id. at 569, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 569-70, 476 A.2d at 1235-36 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The alternatives in-
clude creating a fund for victims by obtaining contributions from intoxicated motorists, re-
quiring a successful suit against the intoxicated driver as a prerequisite to a suit against the
social host on secondary liability, placing a ceiling on the amount of recovery from the social
host, and requiring a finding of wanton and reckless conduct in order for the social host to
be held liable. Id.
77. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
80. 470 A.2d at 510-11.
81. 96 N.J. at 552, 476 A.2d at 1226.
82. Wisniewski v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 226 Pa. Super. 574, 581, 323
A.2d 744, 748 (1974).
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garding the issue of proximate causation.
IV. PROXIMATE CAUSATION AND SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY
A. The Pennsylvania Approach
To reiterate, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court engaged in only a
cursory analysis of the issue of proximate causation in social host
liability cases. The court stated that in regard to the normal adult,
"it is the consumption of the alcohol, which is the proximate cause
of any subsequent occurrence."8 This passage constitutes the en-
tire discussion by the majority on the issue of proximate causa-
tion.84 The court failed to attempt even a consideration of the pos-
sibility of multiple causation. This approach to the issue of social
host liability, grounded in common law negligence principles, is
one that has been echoed time after time by courts of other states
in order to deny liability.85
B. The New Jersey Approach
In contrast to the traditional rationale offered by the court in
Klein, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Kelly v. Gwinnell en-
gaged in a principled discussion of social host liability under gen-
eral common law negligence principles. After establishing both the
power of the court to change or modify the common law and the
court's historical function in determining the scope of duty in neg-
83. 470 A.2d at 510.
84. The court cites Annot., 97 A.L.R. 3d 528, 533 (1980), and 45 Am. JUR. 2D Intoxicat-
ing Liquors § 553 (1969), for support of the common law rule that it is the consumption not
the furnishing of the alcohol which constitutes the proximate cause. 470 A.2d at 510.
The A.L.R. volume cites to Am. Jur. for support; Am. Jur. cites in support: Cherbonnier.v.
Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D.C. Alaska 1950); Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d
383 (1967); Elder v. Fischer, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co.,
248 La. 982, 183 So.2d 328 (1966); Hail v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966) [over-
ruled by Pence v. Ketchum, 326 So.2d 831 (La. 1976)]; Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385
S.W.2d 656 (1965); Mitchell v. Ketner, 64 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1965); Colligan
v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963); Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d
886 (1955); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Belding v. John-
son, 86 Ga. 177, 12 S.E. 304 (1890).
However, the courts in Cherbonnier and Elder recognized that some states view the com-
mon law rule to be otherwise. Cherbonnier, 88 F. Supp. at 901-903; Elder, 247 Ind. at 604,
217 N.E.2d at 851.
85. See supra note 84. For several earlier decisions, see Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20
N.E. 73 (1889) (plaintiff's decedent had been given two alcoholic drinks by the defendant, a
social host, and died when he fell off his horse while intoxicated); Woody v. Coenan, 44 Iowa
19 (1876) (prior to legislative enactment, court held there was no right to recover for injuries
resulting from sale of beer). But see Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579, 11 A. 779 (1887).
For further discussion of Rommel, see infra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
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ligence, e the majority turned its attention to whether liability
should exist on the part of the social host, and whether and to
whom a duty is owed.
The majority began by positing a general test for the existence
of the social host's duty: "whether the reasonably prudent person
at the time and place should recognize and foresee an unreasonable
risk or likelihood of harm or dangers to others. 8 7 The serving of
alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest, whom the host knows will
soon thereafter be driving, was said to constitute precisely such a
risk of injury to a third party and is hence negligent conduct on
the part of the host.8s The court continued by stating that once
such negligent conduct creates the risk, the intoxicated driver then
sets off the consequences foreseeable by the host resulting in injury
to the plaintiff. The negligent conduct of the host is thus deemed a
proximate cause of the accident resulting from the guest's intoxi-
cated driving." It is sufficient for the existence of liability that the
proximate cause, i.e., the negligent conduct, was a "substantial fac-
tor" in causing the injuries.9e
The majority then discussed whether or not a duty should be
imposed on social hosts. The court perceived this primarily as a
question of fairness which involved "a weighing of the relationship
of the parties, the nature of the risk and the public interest in the
proposed solution."9' The court found that the policy of the state
in deterring drunk driving 2 and compensating victims of drunk
drivers outweighed the interests of the host, both in terms of social
relationships and possible consequences of economic liability. 3
86. See supra notes 32-36, 58-66 and accompanying text.
87. 96 N.J. at 543, 476 A.2d at 1221.
88. Id. at 543-44, 476 A.2d at 1221-22.
89. Id. at 543, 476 A.2d at 1221.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
92. Id. at 544-45, 476 A.2d at 1222. The majority believed the policy of the state is
exemplified by criminal sanctions against drunken driving in New Jersey which the Gover-
nor of New Jersey believes to be one of the toughest in the nation. Id.
93. Id. at 544-45, 548, 476 A.2d at 1222, 1224. The majority also found support for the
extension of the duty to social hosts as part of a general trend in New Jersey case law. Id. at
545-47, 476 A.2d at 1222-24. The court in Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1
(1959), held a licensee liable in negligence for damages resulting from serving a minor who
was subsequently involved in an accident. This was seen as a breach of duty to the public.
In Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966), the duty of the
licensee was extended to include that owed to the intoxicated customer himself. In so doing,
the court negated the notion that the real fault rested with the consumer of the alcohol.
Finally, in Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976), the Superior Court of
New Jersey held that a social host who served a minor, knowing that the minor would there-
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The majority also analogized the liability of social hosts for fur-
nishing the alcohol to the liability imposed in some states on own-
ers for entrusting their vehicles to persons whom they know to be
intoxicated. 4 Finally, the court stated that the duty owed by social
hosts to the public to refrain from creating foreseeable, unreasona-
ble risks was no less than that owed by liquor licensees. That the
licensee makes a profit while the social host does not was seen by
the court to be irrelevant to the existence of the duty."
The New Jersey Supreme Court, unlike the Klein court, did not
view the issue as being whether consumption or furnishing was the
sole proximate cause. Instead, once the New Jersey court estab-
lished both the elements of common law negligence and the duty
owed to the public by the social host, it then proceeded to find
liability on the part of both the social host and the intoxicated
driver. This liability was extended to them as joint tort-feasors9 6
C. Critique of the Pennsylvania Approach to Proximate
Causation
The decision reached by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is
based on the assertion that the consumption, rather than the fur-
nishing of alcohol is the sole proximate cause of an ensuing acci-
dent. When this is viewed in light of the New Jersey approach and
relevant Pennsylvania case law, it becomes obvious that the deci-
sion is the product of questionable legal reasoning.
Pennsylvania courts have recognized both the ability of the com-
mon law to adapt to modern conditions and the proper role of the
court in determining the scope of duty in negligence law. 7 Fur-
thermore, the Klein court chose not to invoke the doctrine of legis-
lative deference, thus subjecting itself to criticism on its substan-
tive legal reasoning. As a matter of consistent application of
fundamental legal principles within the Commonwealth, the court
should not only have found liability but should have felt compelled
after be driving, was liable for the resultant subsequent injuries suffered by a third party. 96
N.J. at 545-47, 476 A.2d at 1222-24.
94. Id. at 549, 476 A.2d at 1224. See generally Deck v. Sherlock, 162 Neb. 86, 75
N.W.2d 99 (1956); Pennington v. Davis-Child Motor Co., 143 Kan. 753, 57 P.2d 428 (1936);
Knight Gosselin, 124 Cal.App. 290, 12 P.2d 454 (1932); Mitchell v. Churches, 119 Wash. 547,
206 P. 6 (1922).
95. 96 N.J. at 547-48, 476 A.2d at 1224.
96. Id. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230. No decision was made regarding contribution or in-
demnification between the joint tort-feasors. Id. The case was remanded for consideration in
light of New Jersey's Comparative Negligence Act. Id. at 548-49 n.8, 476 A.2d at 1224 n.8.
97. See supra notes 23-31, 80-82 and accompanying text.
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to do so.
The basic definitions and tests for negligence and proximate
causation in Pennsylvania are consistent with those applied by the
New Jersey court. The test for negligence in Pennsylvania is
whether a person of ordinary intelligence could have reasonably
foreseen the harmful consequences resulting from his act."8 The
requisite elements necessary to allow for the maintenance of an ac-
tion in negligence are: a duty at law to conform one's behavior to a
specified standard of conduct, a failure to conform to this stan-
dard, proximate causation and actual losses or damages suffered by
the injured party.9
In Pennsylvania, the test for proximate causation is, as in New
Jersey, whether the defendant's negligent action was a "substantial
factor" in producing the injury complained of by the plaintiff.'00
The "substantial factor" need not be the only cause of the injury
and, in fact, there may exist in any given case two or more sub-
stantial factors.'0 '
This substantial factor analysis of proximate causation was ap-
plied by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Majors v. Brod-
head Hotel0 2 to uphold a licensee's liability under the Pennsylva-
nia Liquor Code. 03 Pennsylvania case law regarding the elements
98. Scurfield v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 335 Pa. 145, 149-50, 6 A.2d 559, 561 (1939).
See also Blake v. Fried, 173 Pa. Super. 27, 95 A.2d 360 (1953).
99. Morena v. South Hills Health System, 501 Pa. 634, 642 n.5, 462 A.2d 680, 684 n.5
(1983).
100. Jones v. Montefiore Hospital, 494 Pa. 410, 416, 431 A.2d 920, 923 (1981) (involv-
ing medical malpractice). See also Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 246, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978). In
this medical malpractice case the court held that once the plaintiff has sufficiently estab-
lished that the defendant's acts were a substantial factor in causing the harm, in order to
escape liability, the defendant must prove that this other cause would have produced said
injury independently of his negligence. Id. at 266, 392 A.2d at 1285.
In Whitner v. Hintz, 437 Pa. 448, 263 A.2d 889 (1970) the court found the "substantial
factor" test to be preferable to the "but for" test of proximate causation. The "substantial
factor" analysis will not find substantiality, and hence no liability if the harmful result
would have occurred in spite of the defendant's negligent conduct. The "but for" test on the
other hand states that liability will exist where the harmful result would not have occurred
"but for" defendant's negligent conduct. The court felt that the "but for" test did not allow
for proper consideration of the foreseeability of the risk. Id. at 456-58, 457 n.6, 263 A.2d at
893-94, 894 n.6.
101. Jones, 494 Pa. at 416, 431 A.2d at 923. See also Boushell v. J. H. Beers, Inc., 215
Pa. Super. 439, 258 A.2d 682 (1969) (plaintiff suffered stress both from blow to head, as well
as from highway construction occurring near his house; and, while neither standing alone
could cause an ulcer they could concurrently constitute a substantial factor and the plaintiff
could recover).
102. 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965).
103. Id. The party recovering was the patron who had been served while intoxicated
and as a result had injured himself. Id. at 267-68, 205 A.2d at 875. See supra note 100.
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and tests for negligence and proximate causation is thus virtually
identical to that of New Jersey. Therefore, the court in Klein was
not constrained by precedent to follow the traditional view that
the sole proximate cause was the consumption of alcohol.104 Given
this, the next step in the analysis is to ascertain whether or not, as
a matter of Pennsylvania law, the court could have found the same
duty owed by the social host to the public which was found in
Kelly. 105
In Pennsylvania, a duty is predicated upon the relationship ex-
isting between the parties as well as the degree of foreseeability of
the harmful consequence.' 0 Furthermore, there exists a general
duty to avoid causing another person harm?°7
These general duties alone should have been sufficient to find a
duty to the public on the part of the social host. That there is no
specific duty placed upon a social host for the serving of alcoholic
beverages seems firmly established by the court in Klein; however,
this view is not consistent with Pennsylvania law.
There does exist a duty owed by a licensee to both the public at
large and the intoxicated drinker himself under the Pennsylvania
Liquor Code.108 This duty is, quite obviously, one that is legisla-
104. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
106. Morena, 501 Pa. at 642, 462 A.2d at 685; Wicks v. Milzoco, 291 Pa. Super. 345,
351, 435 A.2d 1260, 1263 (1981).
107. Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945).
108. Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965).
The duty owed by licensees to the public at large is found in the Pennsylvania Dram Shop
Act which states:
No licensee shall be liable to third persons on account of damages inflicted upon
them off of the licensed premises by customers of the licensee unless the customer
who inflicts the damages was sold, furnished or given liquor or malt or brewed bever-
ages by the said licensee or his agent, servant or employe when the said customer was
visibly intoxicated.
47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §4-497 (Purdon 1969). See also Simon v. Shirely, 269 Pa. Super.
364, 409 A.2d 1365 (1979), where the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a third person
injured by an intoxicated minor who had been served at a bar, would recover under §4-497
and not §4-493(1). Id.
There is also a duty owed to the intoxicated individual and possibly still to the public at
large under another section of the Liquor Code which creates criminal liability:
For any licensee of the board, or any employe, servant or agent of such licensee or
of the board, or any other person, to sell, furnish or give any liquor or malt or brewed
beverages, or to permit any liquor or malt or brewed beverages to be sold, furnished
or given, to any person visibly intoxicated, or to any insane person, or to any minor,
or to habitual drunkards, or persons of known intemperate habits.
47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §4-493(1) (Purdon 1969). Prior to the enactment of the dram shop
act, this section of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code created a duty to the public at large and
its violation constituted negligence per se. 416 Pa. at 268, 205 A.2d at 875-76. It is not at
1138
Social Host Liability
tively, not judicially imposed. In Manning v. Andy, the court held
that a social host was not covered by this liability-creating enact-
ment of the state legislature, thus foreclosing the existence of a
duty of the social host under section 4-493 of the Liquor Code.109
The Pennsylvania dram shop act is quite explicit in stating that
liability under that particular section of the Liquor Code is im-
posed on licensees only.110 Indeed, in support of the Klein decision,
it could be argued that the state legislature has spoken on the non-
existence of social host liability. This argument would state that
when drafting the Liquor Code in general and the dram shop act in
particular, the state legislature considered all of the possible per-
sons upon whom liability might attach, i.e., who would owe a duty,
and the legislature chose to find such a duty only for those men-
tioned in the statute. Social hosts were not among those so men-
tioned and, therefore, the legislature has spoken on social host lia-
bility.111 The Klein majority, however, did not choose to base its
decision on this argument, but instead chose to address the liabil-
ity of social hosts on the substantive merits of common law negli-
gence principles.
The issue of a duty for social hosts under the Pennsylvania Li-
quor Code could, however, ultimately be a question of statutory
interpretation of the criminal liability provided for in section 4-
493(1). This is best exemplified by the strong dissent of Justice
Manderino in Manning v. Andy. ' 2 Justice Manderino argued that
the language creating criminal liability for licensees, the board,
employees of the licensees and "any other person"'1 3 was meant to
present entirely clear if this section still indicates a duty to the public at large or only to the
intoxicated patron himself. The superior court has hinted that §4-493(1) would still have
vitality at least for injury to the intoxicated patron himself. Simon v. Shirely, 269 Pa. Super.
at 367 n.5, 409 A.2d at 1366 n.5.
Interestingly, the duty imposed to refrain from furnishing liquor to a habitual drunkard is
somewhat analogous to the duty imposed at common law to refrain from providing drugs to
a known habitual user. A violation of this duty could serve as a basis for an action for loss of
services, support and consortium. Halverson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 765,
458 P.2d 897, 901 (1969) (Finley, J., dissenting). See also Annot., 130 A.L.R. 352 (1941).
109. 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75. But see id. at 242-50, 310 A.2d at 76-81 (Manderino, J.,
dissenting); Klein, 470 A.2d at 511 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).
110. 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-497 (Purdon 1969).
111. See Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964).
112. 454 Pa. at 242-50, 310 A.2d at 76-81 (Manderino, J., dissenting). The dissent au-
thored by Justice Manderino was thought of highly enough that Justice Larsen quoted it in
its entirety as his dissent to Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d at 511 (Larsen, J., dissenting).




include social hosts as a matter of ejusdem generis. Although
the majority rejected the idea, it would nonetheless seem possible
that at some point in the future the court may wish to adopt the
position of Justice Manderino and find that a social host duty ex-
isted all along. Such theorizing is admittedly highly speculative. It
would have to overcome the reading in pari materia of sections 4-
498(1) and 4-497, as well as the argument that 4-497 was intended
to cover the entire range of persons subject to tort liability. Given
the Klein decision, such a result is unlikely.
On the same day that the Klein decision was handed down, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Congini v. Portersville Valve
Co., in which liability for a social host was found to exist for the
furnishing of intoxicating beverages to a minor. Liability was pred-
icated on the Pennsylvania Crimes Code which makes it a crime to
serve a minor." 5 The court found a duty owed to both the minor
and the public at large to be protected from "the perceived delete-
rious effects of serving alcohol to persons under twenty-one years
of age.""' 6
Justice Zappala dissented in Congini, putting forth the interest-
ing postulate that the majority had, in effect, overruled Klein.f17
The justice stated that if liability in Congini were based upon a
public policy to protect the public at large, then such public policy
could at some point in the future be manipulated to extend sup-
port to social host liability in a Klein situation.118 The dissent fur-
ther contended that in Congini it was the knowledge of the social
host regarding the inability of the guest to safely consume the alco-
hol which the majority used as a basis for creating liability."1 Jus-
tice Zappala found this to be entirely inconsistent with the Klein
decision, thus placing the question of duty and liability once again
in doubt. 20 The dissent demonstrates that while the Klein deci-
114. 454 Pa. at 246-48, 310 A.2d at 79-80 (Manderino, J., dissenting). It was the opin-
ion of Justice Manderino that § 4-493(1) created a standard of care which, if violated, would
establish criminal liability. The cause of action on the civil side should then be based on
ordinary negligence principles patterned on this standard of reasonable conduct. Id. at 249,
310 A.2d at 81.
115. See supra note 2.
116. Congini, 470 A.2d at 518.
117. Id. at 520 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
118. Id. Specifically, Justice Zappala stated that the liability imposed on the social
host for serving a minor is indistinguishable from the public policy behind Pennsylvania's
drunk driving laws-that the public must be protected from intoxicated operators of motor
vehicles. Id. at 520 n.2 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 521 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 520 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
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sion not to extend liability to social hosts stands as good and valid
case law, these perceived inconsistencies with Congini could con-
ceivably provide, at some point in the future, a basis for an con-
trary holding by a more judicially active court.
The failure of the Klein court to find a duty on the part of the
social host is also perplexing when one considers an analogous find-
ing of such a duty by Pennsylvania courts-the duty imposed on
the owner of a vehicle not to loan his car to an incapacitated indi-
vidual. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Kelly analogized the lia-"
bility imposed on the social host to the imposition of such liability
on owners of vehicles who lend their automobiles to intoxicated
individuals.'" The general duty which would underly liability in
the two situations-furnishing alcohol to an intoxicated guest who
will soon be driving, and the lending of a motor vehicle to the in-
toxicated person-is to protect the public at large from the disas-
trous consequences of drunken driving.'
It has long been a part of Pennsylvania tort law that the owner
of a motor vehicle is under a duty to refrain from loaning his vehi-
cle to any person he knows to be an incompetent and that a viola-
tion of this duty can bring liability upon the owner.' 3 The incom-
petency of the individual includes, but is not limited to,
characteristics of recklessness or carelessness, lack of physical driv-
ing skill, minor status, and other physical or mental
impairments.1"4
121. 96 N.J. at 549, 476 A.2d at 1224. The majority stated:
The liability we impose here is analogous to that traditionally imposed on owners of
vehicles who lend their cars to persons they know to be intoxicated. . . . If, by lend-
ing a car to a drunk, a host becomes liable to third parties injured by the drunken
driver's negligence, the same liability should extend to a host who furnishes liquor to
a visibly drunken guest who he knows will thereafter drive away.
Id. See also Chalmers v. Harris Motors, Inc., 104 N.H. 111, 179 A.2d 447 (1962); Deck v.
Sherlock, 162 Neb. 86, 75 N.W.2d 99 (1956); Pennington v. Davis-Child Motor Co., 143 Kan.
753, 57 P.2d 428 (1936); Knight v. Gosselin, 124 Cal. App. 290, 12 P.2d 454 (1932); Mitchell
v. Churches, 119 Wash. 547, 206 P. 6 (1922).
122. 96 N.J. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
123. See DeLair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392, 188 A. 181 (1936) (involving automobile with
defective tires); Raub v. Donn, 254 Pa. 203, 98 A. 861 (1916) (young woman struck by auto-
mobile driven by a twenty-one year old man who had reputation for reckless driving).
124. Laubach v. Colley, 283 Pa. 366, 369-70, 129 A. 88, 89 (1925) (allowing a minor to
operate a motor vehicle which was then wrecked was negligence on the part of the owner);
Raub, 254 Pa. at 206-07, 98 A. at 862. See generally 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1501-1519
(Purdon 1977). But cf Chamberlain v. Riddle, 155 Pa. Super. 507, 38 A.2d 521 (1944). The
court acknowledged negligence for loaning a motor vehicle to a person known to be incom-
petent. However, the court held that the driver's failure to secure a license was not in and of
itself proof of incompetency. Id. at 510, 38 A.2d at 523.
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The question becomes whether a person known by the owner to
be intoxicated will fall into the category of incompetent individu-
als. It seems fairly clear as a matter of Pennsylvania law that in-
competents are to include intoxicated individuals. The leading case
is Gibson v. Bruner,12 5 which involved the allegation that the de-
fendant/father had negligently entrusted his employer's truck to
his visibly intoxicated son and should thus be liable for a subse-
quent accident involving the intoxicated son.12 6 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that under the facts as presented 2 7 there was
no evidence that the son was visibly intoxicated while in his fa-
ther's presence, and, therefore, the father was held not liable.1
2 8
The court, however, stated that the father "would not be liable for
his son's transgressions unless he knew when he permitted [his
son] to take the truck that, by reason of intoxication, he was unfit
to drive the truck. 12' 9 The court thus conceded that had the facts
been different liability would exist for loaning the vehicle to the
intoxicated adult. Similar liability on the part of an owner was




Finally, although an argument has not been made as such, it
would seem that entrustment to an intoxicated driver could consti-
tute negligence under the Motor Vehicle Code. 132 In Laubach v.
125. 406 Pa. 315, 178 A.2d 145 (1961).
126. Id. at 316-18, 178 A.2d at 146.
127. Bernard Bruner, sub-foreman for a construction company, drove the company
truck to one of his construction projects, taking along with him as his passenger, his son
Edward Bruner. En route to their destination, they each had one or two beers. They then
stopped at the home of one of Bernard Bruner's employees where Edward Bruner had one
or two more beers. At this point, Bernard loaned the truck to his son. Two and one-half
hours later, after drinking one or two more beers, Bernard was involved in a head-on colli-
sion. One of the two occupants of the other car died. His wife suffered serious and perma-
nent injuries. Edward Bruner was visibly intoxicated at the time of the accident. Id. at 318-
19, 178 A.2d at 146-47.
128. Id. at 321-22, 178 A.2d at 148.
129. Id. at 321, 178 A.2d at 148 (emphasis in original).
130. 9 Adams Co. L. J. 1 (1967).
131. Id. On August 28, 1965, an automobile, owned by Kenneth Flory and operated by
Leroy Fickes, collided with a car driven by Herbert Washabaugh, resulting in the death of
Mr. Washabaugh and injuries to the passengers of the Washabaugh vehicle. Mr. Flory was
alleged to have been negligent both in loaning his automobile to Fickes, whom he knew at
the time was too intoxicated to safely operate the vehicle, and in that he had allowed his car
to be taken by Fickes without his consent. The defendant Fickes demurred that neither
allegation constituted negligence. The court upheld the allegation of negligence for loaning
an automobile to someone known to be intoxicated. The second allegation of negligence was
struck as being inconsistent with the first. Id. at 1-3.
132. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-9009 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
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Colley,133 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that entrusting a
vehicle to an individual by statute prohibited from operating a mo-
tor vehicle constituted grounds for an action in negligence."3 4
While the statute relied upon has been repealed, vestiges of the
statute do remain. In particular, section 1501(a) states that all per-
sons, except those specifically exempted, must be licensed. 3 5 How-
ever, under section 1503, a person cannot obtain a license if he or
she is "a user of alcohol or any controlled substance to a degree
rendering the user incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle.""3 6
This would seem to bolster the argument that the class of incom-
petents was meant to include intoxicated drivers.
The court in Klein ignored the duty imposed on an owner not to
knowingly lend his motor vehicle to a visibly intoxicated individ-
ual. The existence of such a duty lends strong support to a decision
contrary to that reached in Klein. The court either did not appre-
ciate this analogous duty or simply chose not to discuss it.
The failure of the Klein court to find a duty based on the afore-
mentioned duties is puzzling, but when one considers Rommel v.
Schambacher,3 7 it seems inexplicable. Rommel involved a suit re-
sulting from injuries sustained by the plaintiff, a minor, who was
attacked in the defendant's tavern. The brutal assault was commit-
ted by a patron of the defendant whom the defendant had served
while visibly intoxicated. 38 The court found that the tavern keeper
owed a duty to his customers not to allow a drunken customer to
harm other patrons. 39 This duty was found without the aid of a
dram shop or other similar statute. As the court stated, "[a]ll this
is a plain matter of common law and good sense, and does not
depend on the act of 1854, or any other statute." 40 The argument
of the Klein court that there does not exist a common law duty nor
a cause of action for the furnishing of alcohol, in the absence of a
statute, is thus incorrect as a matter of Pennsylvania law. The pri-
133. 283 Pa. 366, 129 A. 88 (1925). See supra note 124.
134. Id. at 369-70, 129 A. at 89. The prior statute provided: "No person, whether the
owner of a motor vehicle or not, who is less than sixteen (16) years of age, or who is men-
tally impaired, or who is physically incapacitated as defined in this act, shall operate any
motor vehicle upon any public highway in this Commonwealth." 1919 Pa. Laws 679, § 10.
135. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1501 (1977).
136. Id. § 1503.
137. 120 Pa. 579, 11 A. 779 (1887).
138. Id. The attack consisted of the intoxicated patron pinning a piece of paper to the
back of the plaintiff and lighting it. The plaintiff was severely burned as a result. This all
occurred in clear sight of the tavern keeper. Id. at 581-82, 11 A. at 779.
139. Id. at 582, 11 A. at 779.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
1985 1143
Duquesne Law Review
mary reason for the court's failure to even discuss this duty is the
majority's insistence that there be only one possible proximate
cause. 41 Whatever merit there is for such an approach evaporates
when one considers that Pennsylvania law recognizes the concept
of joint tort-feasors.
The Pennsylvania legislature manifested its recognition and ap-
proval of the concept of joint tort-feasors with its adoption of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act. 42 The statute de-
fines joint tort-feasors as "two or more persons jointly or severally
liable in tort for the same injury to persons or property ... .
The remainder of the Act defines the rights of contribution, effects
of judgments, releases of other tort-feasors, and the effect of such
release on contribution.
44
In addition to the statutory law on the subject, Pennsylvania
courts have recognized and further defined the law of joint tort-
feasor liability. The concept of joint tort-feasorship was expounded
upon by the superior court in Lasprogata v. Qualls.145 The Laspro-
gata case involved a suit by an injured motorist against the treat-
ing physician, a manufacturer of surgical products, and a hospi-
tal.' 1 The doctor, in turn, joined the other driver as a negligent
third party whose acts were alleged to be the proximate cause of
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff.' 47 The issue, in essence, 148
became whether or not the driver whose negligence caused the ac-
cident and the doctor who later negligently treated the injured mo-
torists were joint tortfeasors.' 49 Judge Cercone, writing for the
court, adopted the definition that joint tort-feasors are those par-
ties who either act together in the commission of a wrong or those
whose acts, although independent of one another, unite to cause a
wrong.'50 Judge Cercone also stated that a joint tort exists "where
two or more persons owe to another the same duty and by their
141. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
142. See 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 8321-8327 (Purdon 1982).
143. Id. § 8322.
144. Id. §§ 8324-83.
145. 263 Pa. Super. 174, 397 A.2d 803 (1979).
146. Id. at 177, 397 A.2d at 804.
147. Id. at 177-78, 397 A.2d at 804.
148. The ultimate issue involved the effect of a release obtained by the negligent
driver-in return for a $15,000 settlement-upon the later lawsuit against the other tort-
feasors. Id. at 178 n.1, 397 A.2d at 805 n.1. The release issue is not pertinent to the present
discussion.
149. Id.




common neglect such other is injured."' 15' The court held that
"[t]he acts of the original wrongdoer. . . are severable as to time,
neither having the opportunity to guard against the other's acts,
and each breaching a different duty owed to the injured plain-
tiff.' 52 The court then held that the motorist whose negligence re-
sulted in the plaintiff motorist's injuries and the physician who
later aggravated those injuries were not joint tort-feasors. 153
Several years later, in Pratt v. Stein,'" the court clarified the
joint tort-feasor doctrine, especially as it related to the duty as-
pects. Pratt involved injuries suffered by the plaintiff whose auto-
mobile was struck from the rear by another vehicle. The plaintiff
was hospitalized as a result of these injuries.15 5 The plaintiff, Pratt,
was subsequently referred to two of the defendants, Doctors Stein
and Kambin. Stein, after several examinations, operated on the
plaintiff's back on December 31, 1964.156 A resultant infection at
the operative site was treated by both doctors with antibiotics, and
on January 26, 1965, a second operation was performed by
Kambin.157 Upon discharge, plaintiff, who was left totally immobi-
lized and deaf, subsequently filed separate actions against the neg-
ligent motorists and against the two doctors and the hospital. 58
The doctors were alleged to have been jointly and severably liable
as joint tort-feasors for negligent treatment. 5"
The majority rejected the doctors' reliance on Lasprogata for
the proposition that they as doctors could not be found liable as
joint tort-feasors. The court held that the acts were not sufficiently
severable as to time, that they had had an opportunity to guard
against each others' negligent acts, and, perhaps most importantly,
that they each owed the same general duty to the plaintiff-to ex-
ercise reasonable medical care.6 0 The two doctors were held to be
151. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (4th ed. 1968)).
152. Id. at 179, 397 A.2d at 805 (emphasis added).
153. Id.
154. 298 Pa. Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982).
155. Id. at 102, 444 A.2d at 680.
156. Id. at 103, 444 A.2d at 680. The operation involved a laminectomy with a dis-
cetomy and a fusion of two vertebrae in the plaintiff's spine. Id.
157. Id. This operation was done in order to open and drain the infected area and also
to remove the bones engrafted during the prior fusion. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 150, 444 A.2d at 704-05. The court stated that defendant's reliance on Las-
progata was misplaced because the holding there was limited to the proposition that "the
original wrongdoer, a negligent motorist, and the negligent physician who subsequently ag-
gravated the original, or caused a new, injury were not joint tort-feasors." Id. at 150, 444
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joint tort-feasors.' 6 ' The duty held by joint tort-feasors, therefore,
can be a general duty owed to the plaintiff. By analogy, there
would seem to be a similar general duty owed to the public at
large, which has a right to be protected from the disastrous conse-
quences of drunken driving.
16 2
It is apparent from the case law regarding joint tort-feasors that
the Klein decision should have resulted in joint tort-feasor liabil-
ity. The statement made by the court in Lasprogata that the tort
cannot be joint if severable in time is not meant to be read so
strictly as to require both parties to act simultaneously, although
this is often the case.
163
It has long been recognized as a matter of law in Pennsylvania
that the negligent act of the one joint tort-feasor can occur earlier
in time than the negligent act of the other joint tort-feasors. An
early decision, O'Malley v. Laurel Line Bus Co.,"" involved a bus
line whose driver negligently discharged a passenger into the
street, after which the passenger was struck by a negligent motor-
ist.16 5 The court stated:
If two or more negligences are existing at the time of an injury and concur
in producing it, the fact that one preceded the other slightly in point of
time is a matter of no moment, and the rule as to concurrent negligence,
under which both the parties are held jointly and severably liable, and not
that of proximate and remote cause, will be applied.166
What is important is that the original tort-feasor first placed the
plaintiff in peril and this negligence continued until the second
tort-feasor transforms the peril into an injury.'
A.2d at 704.
161. Id. at 150-51 n.50, 444 A.2d at 705 n.50.
162. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
163. For examples of immediately concurring acts of negligence, see generally Hilbert
v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959) (the plaintiff was injured when the automobile he
was driving was struck by one defendant who at the time was drag racing with the second
defendant); Davis v. Miller, 305 Pa. 348, 123 A.2d 422 (1956) (the plaintiffs were passengers
in an automobile driven by one defendant who collided with the other defendant); Builders
Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368 (1951) (one defendant in order to avoid the
second defendant at an intersection swerved his truck into the oncoming lane of traffic with
a resultant collision with the plaintiff); Davenport v. Evans, 360 Pa. 74, 60 A.2d 30 (1948)
(one defendant truck driver attempted to make a turn without signaling and second defen-
dant truck driver following behind swerved to avoid the collision and struck head-on with
plaintiff); Long v. Thomasberger, 14 D. & C.2d 30 (C.P. Cambria Cty. 1958) (plaintiff guest
sued host driver and driver of the other automobile for injuries resulting from the collision).
164. 311 Pa. 251, 166 A. 868 (1933).
165. Id. at 253-54, 166 A. at 869.
166. Id. at 255, 166 A. at 869.
167. Coyne v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 393 Pa. 326, 335-36, 141 A.2d 830, 835 (1958) (in-
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While there are indeed limits to the length of permissible time
between the initial and final acts of negligence,168 it would seem
that a social host furnishing alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest
and the resultant accident would fall well within permissible lim-
its. Of particular interest is Diehl v. Fidelity Philadelphia Trust
Co.,19 which involved injuries suffered by a plaintiff who slipped
and fell on ice that had accumulated on the sidewalk.17 0 The ice
was formed by steam which the first defendant, Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company, negligently allowed to escape over the side-
walk of the second defendant, Fidelity Trust. The steam con-
densed, fell to the sidewalk, and formed ice. Enough time had
elapsed to allow Fidelity to be charged with notice and thus negli-
gence for failure to remove it. 17 The court thus held that both de-
fendants were jointly and severally liable.
172
While the time between acts is certainly not without limits,
1 73 it
would seem that the period in Klein should have fallen within per-
missible limits. 11 ' The typical social host situation involves the
serving of alcohol to an intoxicated guest who is then involved in
an automobile accident within the next several hours while still
under the influence of the alcohol.175 There can be little doubt that
volving the negligent discharge of a streetcar passenger who was then struck by a passing
motorist).
168. See supra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
169. 159 Pa. Super. 513, 49 A.2d 190 (1946).
170. Id. at 515, 49 A.2d at 191.
171. Id. at 515-16, 49 A.2d at 191-92.
172. Id. at 518, 49 A.2d at 192.
173. See supra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
There could conceivably~be quite some period of time between the original and final acts
of negligence. In Stearns v. Mount Lebanon Twp., 167 Pa. Super. 341, 74 A.2d 779 (1950),
the plaintiff slipped and fell on a public sidewalk. The township was charged with negli-
gently constructing the sidewalk at too steep of a grade, and the property owner responsible
for its upkeep was alleged to have negligently allowed the sidewalk to become slippery. The
court conceded that the property owners may have been jointly liable with the township. Id.
at 342-44, 74 A.2d 780-81. No mention was made of the length of time between the acts of
negligence though it is conceivable that this joint liability could extend to a period of several
months before it would become too remote in time.
174. No court, however, has defined the permissible limits of time. See Smith v. Fen-
ner, 399 Pa. 633, 161 A.2d 150 (1960). The plaintiff, Smith, was helping two of the defen-
dants, Falcone and McBeth, to disengage the bumpers of their respective automobiles which
were interlocked on the highway when an automobile driven by the third defendant, Fenner,
struck Smith. Id. at 634, 161 A.2d at 151. The court held that all three were joint tort-
feasors. Id. at 642, 161 A.2d at 155. While the court again failed to state how far apart in
time the two acts of negligence were, it may well have been several hours, i.e., the amount of
time involved in most social host liability situations.
175. See 96 N.J. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220. The accident in Kelly occurred twenty-five
minutes after the guest had left the host's residence. Id. The Klein decision only states that
Duquesne Law Review
the social host situation fits squarely within the concept of joint
tort-feasors, and the Klein majority's reasons for speaking of a sole
proximate cause are on unsteady ground.
176
V. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Klein is an
unfortunate failure of judicial reasoning. Pennsylvania courts rec-
ognize that the common law must adapt to modern conditions in
an ever-changing society. Having decided not to base the decision
on deference to the legislature, the Klein majority attempted to
provide a sound justification for the denial of social host liability
on the basis of common law negligence principles. All of the ele-
ments of negligence which are necessary to find social host liabil-
ity, however, exist as a matter of law within the Commonwealth,
including most importantly the duty owed to the public to refrain
from the creation of unreasonable risks. The court's adherence to
the often repeated statement that it is the consumption rather
than the furnishing of alcohol, which is the proximate cause of any
subsequent occurrence is simply not supportable in light of mod-
ern jurisprudence.
The ultimate losers are the members of the innocent public who
must suffer the consequences of drunken driving. The Common-
wealth recognizes criminal liability for the individual who places a
firearm in the hands of a person whom the provider has reasonable
cause to believe has violent criminal tendencies or is of unsteady
character. 77 The liability of a social host is no different. The Klein
court's failure to extend tort liability to the social host is a misap-
plication of the body of Pennsylvania jurisprudence.
Russell K. Broman
the subsequent accident occurred the same day, presumably within a matter of a few hours.
Klein, 470 A.2d at 508.
In fact, had the court recognized social host liability, it is possible that the host might
have escaped liability due to the intervening negligence of a tavernkeeper, who had served
the guest after he left his host's residence, but prior to the collision. Id.
176. See Schiele v. Motor Freight Express, Inc., 348 Pa. 525, 36 A.2d 467 (1944) (that
an act is the proximate cause does not mean that it is the sole proximate cause).
177. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 6110 (Purdon 1983). The statute states:
No person shall deliver a firearm to any person under the age of 18 years, or to one
he has reasonable cause to believe has been convicted of a crime of violence, or is a
drug addict, an habitual drunkard, or of unsound mind.
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